Physical cryptographic primitives by chemical vapor deposition of
  layered MoS2 by Alharbi, Abdullah et al.
Physical cryptographic primitives by chemical
vapor deposition of layered MoS2
Abdullah Alharbi, Darren Armstrong, Somayah Alharbi, and Davood Shahrjerdi∗
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY
E-mail: davood@nyu.edu
Abstract
Development of physical cryptographic primitives for generating strong security
keys is central to combating security threats such as counterfeiting and unauthorized
access to electronic devices. We introduce a new class of physical cryptographic primi-
tives from layered molybdenum disulfide (MoS2) which leverages the unique properties
of this material system. Using chemical vapor deposition, we synthesize a MoS2 mono-
layer film covered with speckles of multilayer islands, where the growth process is
engineered for an optimal speckle density. The physical cryptographic primitive is an
array of 2048 pixels fabricated from this film. Using the Clark-Evans test, we con-
firm that the distribution of islands on the film exhibits complete spatial randomness,
making this cryptographic primitive ideal for security applications. A unique optical
response is generated by applying an optical stimulus to the structure. The basis for
this unique response is the dependence of the photoemission on the number of MoS2
layers which by design is random throughout the film. The optical response is used to
generate cryptographic keys. Standard security tests confirm the uniqueness, reliabil-
ity, and uniformity of these keys. This study reveals a new opportunity for generating
strong and versatile nano-engineered security primitives from layered transition metal
dichalcogenides.
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Modern society demands information security1. Globalization of supply chains has un-
dermined trust in electronic devices, which were once manufactured entirely by a single
trusted factory. Further, the ubiquity of today’s advanced manufacturing poses additional
challenges, because such resources are now more accessible to adversaries for developing
sophisticated security attacks. A vast number of such attacks are physical2,3 and range
from counterfeiting to various forms of unauthorized access such as reverse engineering and
side-channel attacks. Authentication of electronic devices through unique security keys has
become the first line of defense. A security key must be easy to generate and yet impos-
sible to replicate. An increasingly popular method of generating security keys is based on
physical cryptographic primitives which leverage the inherent randomness of a structure or
a physical process (e.g. manufacturing variability or materials disorders)4–10. Applying a
challenge (such as an electrical or an optical stimulus) to the cryptographic primitive pro-
duces a unique response (a security key). Hence, this concept produces cryptographic keys
that are unique for each electronic device.
At present, silicon-based security primitives are widely used due to their compatibility
with the complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology10. However, the
device variability begins to diminish as a given CMOS technology matures, thereby reducing
the effectiveness of these silicon cryptographic primitives. In fact, mature CMOS technolo-
gies are increasingly used in many applications ranging from automotive industry to smart
gadgets for the so-called Internet-of-Things, thereby leaving them vulnerable to the growing
security threats. It is also infeasible for silicon-based primitives to secure many emerging
technologies simply due to practical considerations such as material compatibility, robust
operation, and cost. Flexible electronics and self-powered sensor nodes are prime exam-
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Figure 1: MoS2-based physical cryptographic primitives: (a) Schematic illustration of
the energy band structure of monolayer and multilayer MoS2, indicating strong dependence
of excitonic emission on the number of MoS2 layers. (b) CVD using solid-phase precursors
was used for synthesis of large-area MoS2 films. (c) Photo of a CVD MoS2 sample indicating
two distinct regions of growth. Scale bar is 5 mm. (d) An array of 32× 64 pixels was then
formed in region II. (e) Stimulating the physical MoS2 primitive with a laser light produces
a unique optical response with randomly distributed ON and OFF pixels.
ples for such emerging technologies. Hence, there is a need for developing new non-silicon
cryptographic primitives that are strong, robust, and versatile.
Nanomaterials offer distinct physical properties which are often nonexistent in silicon. In
the past two decades, the continual discovery of new nanomaterials, from carbon nanotubes
to two-dimensional (2D) transition metal dichalcogenides (TMDs), has formed the basis for
creating the next-generation electronics that are high-speed and low-power11–13. However,
the variability of nanomaterials remains a practical barrier for making these devices on a
large scale14,15. On the other hand, this randomness provides an opportunity for making
physically unclonable security primitives. This concept is experimentally demonstrated by
the recent work of Hu et al. which implements a new electrical cryptographic primitive using
the randomness of a carbon nanotube assembly process16. Beyond carbon nanotubes, the
prospects of layered TMDs for security applications are still unexplored.
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Here, we introduce a physical cryptographic primitive constructed from layered molyb-
denum disulfide (MoS2). We used MoS2 as the model system since it has been heavily
studied in the family of 2D layered TMDs17,18. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed concept.
Our approach combines two fundamental phenomena for producing physically unclonable
MoS2-based primitives. The first phenomenon is the inherent difference in excitonic emission
strengths of a monolayer and a multilayer MoS2, an attribute unique to most semiconducting
TMDs as shown in figure 1a. The second phenomenon relates to complete spatial random-
ness of an ideal island growth, that is inherent to thin film growth techniques. A large-area
MoS2 film is produced using a chemical vapor deposition (CVD) process in a layer-plus-island
growth mode (figure 1b). Figure 1c shows the photo of a CVD MoS2 film, illustrating two
distinct growth regions on the substrate. The region of interest (i.e. region II) is composed
of a continuous MoS2 monolayer (1L) with speckles of multilayer (bilayer 2L or few-layer
FL) islands. We engineer the growth process to achieve an optimal island density in this re-
gion. We confirmed the spatial randomness of the multilayer islands using the statistical test
by Clark-Evans19. The physical cryptographic primitive itself is fabricated as a 2048-pixel
array from the film in this region (figure 1d). Application of an optical (laser) stimulus to
the security primitive results in random ON and OFF pixels (figure 1e), owing to the spatial
randomness of the multilayers and the different photoemission strengths of monolayer and
multilayer pixels. Using standard security tests, we confirm the randomness and stability of
security keys generated from the proposed physical cryptographic primitive.
Layer-plus-island growth of CVD MoS2
Among the different methods for growing TMDs, CVD techniques have shown better thick-
ness control on a large scale20–23. We grew large-area MoS2 films onto 285 nm SiO2 on p
+
silicon substrates by CVD from sulfur and MoO3 precursors
24. Figure 1b schematically il-
lustrates the CVD reactor based on the solid-phase precursors. Two distinct growth regions
are typically evident along the substrate (see figure 1c), indicating that in this CVD process
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the growth depends on the distance of the substrate from the MoO3 powder. Region I is the
farthest from the MoO3 powder in the reactor, where the optimal growth conditions yield a
continuous monolayer. Region II, located closer to the MoO3 powder, is covered by a contin-
uous monolayer film with randomly distributed multilayer islands. According to the surface
science of thin film growth, the growth mode strongly depends on the deposition rate of
the growth species and the substrate temperature25. It is known that the growth mode will
deviate from the layer-by-layer mode to the layer-plus-island mode once the deposition rate
exceeds a critical value. This explains the presence of these two prominent growth modes
along the substrate22,25. Indeed, the layer-by-layer growth occurs in region I with low Mo
vapor pressure and the growth follows a site-saturated growth kinetics (see Supplementary
Information). Despite the spatial randomness of the nucleation sites, region I of our samples
is sub-optimal for constructing a dense array of random binary code because of the the rela-
tively sparse spatial distribution of the multilayer films grown mostly at the grain boundaries
(spacing from 20-80 µm). In contrast, region II (closer to the MoO3 powder) is exposed to
a higher concentration of Mo vapor, resulting in the layer-plus-island growth mode and thus
the random nucleation of multilayer islands on the monolayer film, as shown in figure 2a. To
produce the physical cryptographic primitive, we engineer the growth process in this region
to achieve an optimal surface coverage of the multilayer islands.
Engineering and testing growth randomness
Complete spatial randomness (CSR) is central to constructing strong cryptographic keys
in our proposed concept. To test for CSR of the island growth in region II, we apply the
statistical test by Clark and Evans19 on images from this region, taken at an early stage of
the multilayer nucleation on the continuous monolayer film, e.g. figure 2a at T = 0.25. If the
island growth is CSR, then the distribution of nearest neighbor distances (i.e. the distances
between the islands and their nearest neighbor) has a mean rCSR = 1/(2
√
ρ) and a variance
σ2CSR = (4 − pi)/(4piρ), where ρ is the particle density per unit area. Therefore, we can
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Figure 2: Optimizing the growth randomness: (a) Optical images illustrating the time
evolution of the MoS2 growth in region II, indicating the layer-plus-island growth modes. (b)
Time-dependent normalized surface coverage of monolayer (1L) and multilayer (≥2L) films
in region II. The Avrami equation provides a reasonable fit to the data, further confirming
complete spatial randomness of island nucleation in region II. (c) The fit gives an Avrami
exponent, n of about 2, suggesting 2D disk-shaped growth governed by the surface diffusion.
All scale bars are 30 µm
test for CSR by testing the null hypothesis that the mean of nearest neighbor distances is
equal to rCSR. Using the two-tailed test for the population mean, we compute the standard
Z-score given by:
Z =
〈rs〉 − 〈rCSR〉√
σ2CSR/N
, (1)
where rs is the sample mean of the nearest neighbor distances computed with N particles.
That is,
rs =
N∑
i=1
ri
N
, (2)
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where ri is the nearest neighbor distance of the ith island. At a 0.05 significance level,
the null hypothesis is to be rejected if Z ≤ −1.96 or Z ≥ 1.96. We calculated typical Z
values of about 0.7–1.0 for our samples (see Supplementary Information). Hence, at the 0.05-
level of significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean nearest neighbor
distance is rCSR. This suggests that the island growth in region II exhibits CSR, hence all
the nucleations are independent and the probability of nucleation is the same everywhere on
the surface.
Considering CSR island growth in region II, the Avrami equation26 can be used to draw
insight into the time evolution of island growth. For a growth time t, the fractional surface
coverage f by the multilayer islands is approximated by:
f(t) = 1− e−ktn (3)
where the Avrami exponent n gives information about the kinetics of the island growth. To
analyze the growth kinetics, we prepared several samples with varying growth times while
keeping the other processing conditions identical including the sample dimensions and its
position relative to MoO3. We then imaged the samples to compute the surface coverage in
region II, as shown in figure 2a. Assuming time-invariant growth kinetics, this experiment
provides a good approximation of the time evolution of the surface coverage27. From the
optical images, we made two key observations: (i) nucleation is continuous evident from the
concurrent presence of thin (mostly 2L) and thick islands in all different stages of the growth,
and (ii) the growth is mostly 2D, i.e. the lateral dimensions of islands grow faster than the
thickness. Figure 2b summarizes the time evolution of the normalized surface coverage f for
the monolayer film and the multilayer islands. In this plot, T is the normalized growth time,
defined as T = (t − t0)/t0.5, where t0 denotes the approximate growth time at which the
surface is fully covered by a continuous monolayer and t0.5 represents the time at which 50%
of the monolayer surface area is exposed and the rest is covered by the multilayer islands. In
figure 2c, we plotted ln[− ln(1− f)] as a function of ln(T ), where the slope of the fitted line
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gives the estimate for the Avrami exponent n. We found n ≈ 2 for our growth experiments,
suggesting a 2D disk-shaped growth governed by the surface diffusion. Equation 3 provides
a reasonable fit to the experimental data in figure 2b, further confirming CSR of the growth
in region II. Further, the inflection point of the fitted curve at T ≈ 0.75 corresponds to the
cross-over from the isolated island growth to the island overlap growth.
After analyzing the growth kinetics, we adjusted the growth time to obtain MoS2 films
with equal surface areas of exposed monolayer film and of the multilayer islands, i.e. f = 0.5.
This was done to achieve the maximum randomness in the physical cryptographic primitive
and in the security key responses.
Cryptographic key generation
To implement the MoS2 physical cryptographic primitives, we fabricated dense arrays con-
sisting of 32×64 pixels from the film in region II (see Methods). These arrays have a pixel
size of 2 µm×2 µm and an equal pixel spacing of 2 µm. This pixel size was chosen be-
cause it is comparable with the dimensions of the state-of-the-art CMOS image sensors28.
Figure 3a shows the optical image of a 2D MoS2 array with 2048 pixels, fabricated on a
SiO2/Si substrate. Due to the randomness of the nucleation, the content of each pixel is
random. Specifically, a pixel might consist of a monolayer, a multilayer, or a mixture of
the two. Figure 3b illustrates the zoomed-in view of three neighboring pixels. These pixels
visually look different from one another, indicating their thickness difference. The Raman
fingerprint of these pixels in figure 3c confirms the material type (which is MoS2 here) and
the corresponding thickness, determined from the distance between the peak position of the
in-plane (E12g) and the out-of-plane (A1g) phonon modes.
After fabrication, the physical security primitive was stimulated using a laser light to gen-
erate an optical response. We expect the response to be unique to the cryptographic primitive
given the random thickness distribution of the CVD MoS2 and the thickness dependence of
the excitonic emissions in MoS2. Specifically, pixels covered mostly by a monolayer film are
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Figure 3: MoS2 physical cryptographic primitive: (a) Optical image of a 2D array
with 2048 MoS2 pixels. (b) Zoomed-in optical image of three neighboring MoS2 pixels with
different layer thickness. Corresponding (c) Raman spectra of the pixels with 1L, 2L, and
FL thickness. (d) The PL characteristics of three pixels covered with 1L, 2L, and mixture
of 1L:2L MoS2. From the data, we set the ON/OFF classification threshold to 0.1.
expected to exhibit strong photon emission (ON pixels), while pixels mostly comprising of
a multilayer film are OFF due to their weak emission properties. Figure 3d compares the
typical photoluminescence (PL) spectra for three pixels comprising of: (i) full monolayer,
(ii) full bilayer, and (iii) 50% monolayer and 50% bilayer. The corresponding optical images
are shown in Supplementary Information. The PL spectra were normalized relative to that
of the monolayer film. Two key observations are made from this plot. First, the photoe-
mission of the full monolayer pixel is noticeably stronger than the pixel with full bilayer
film. Second, the photoemission of the pixel with 50% monolayer coverage is about 1/10th
of the pixel with full monolayer. Considering that the photoemission of a bilayer film is
stronger than that of a film with three or more layers, the mixed monolayer-bilayer pixel
represents the most ambiguous case for classifying a pixel as ON or OFF within an array.
Therefore, for ON/OFF classification of the pixels, we set the threshold θ of the normalized
photoemission to 0.1. We measured the corresponding PL spectrum of each pixel and then
calculated the total area under the PL emission curve in the wavelength range of 580-770 nm
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Figure 4: Optical response and security metrics of the MoS2 primitive: (a) Stim-
ulating the 2D MoS2 array with a laser light produces a optical response that is unique
to this primitive. (b) The photoemission spatial map was converted to a 2D binary array
by comparing each pixel with the ON/OFF threshold. (c) Standard security tests confirm
uniqueness and repeatability of the security keys. (d) The MoS2 primitives are highly stable.
(the integrated photoemission). Figure 4a is the spatial map of the normalized integrated
photoemission for a 2D MoS2 array. We then converted the photoemission map to a 2D
array of zero and one binary bits by comparing the normalized integrated emission of each
pixel with the ON/OFF threshold θ of 0.1. The extracted 2D random binary code is shown
in figure 4b.
Considering CSR of the island growth and the equal surface coverage by the monolayer
and multilayer MoS2, it is however expected that the distribution of the ON and OFF pixels
shows no or weak dependency on the pixel size and the pixel spacing in the 2D MoS2 array.
We confirmed this by fabricating multiple arrays with different pixel sizes and spacings, where
the arrays demonstrate equal distribution of random ON and OFF pixels (see Supplementary
Information). Hence, the strength of the cryptographic primitive is robust to the pixel choice
and spacing choice.
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Analyzing security and stability metrics
We next analyzed the security metrics of the 2D binary array. Three important metrics are
typically used to evaluate the strength of a cryptographic primitive29: uniqueness, repeata-
bility, and uniformity.
Uniqueness is the ability of a key to be distinguished from other keys. We use the average
Hamming inter-distance to quantify uniqueness. The Hamming inter-distance between two
keys is the minimum number of bit substitutions required to transform one key to another.
The 32 rows of the 2D binary array are 64-bit security keys to be tested. We compute the
Hamming inter-distance of all 496 possible pairs of keys (see Supplementary Information).
Figure 4c shows the Hamming inter-distance distribution. A binomial distribution with
parameters p = 0.495 and N = 64 provides a good fit based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. The inverse of the binomial distribution at cumulative probability 0.05 is 25. This
means that for two randomly generated 64-bit keys, there is a 95% probability that the keys
differ in at least 25 bits. Hence, there is a 95% chance that it will require at least 64 choose
25 (or 4×1017) worst-case number of attempts to guess an unknown key from another known
key.
A random key must also produce a consistent response to a given input challenge. The
difference in response of a given binary key to the same challenge is quantified by the Ham-
ming intra-distance, which represents the repeatability of the random binary code. Therefore,
the ideal intra-distance is zero. Figure 4c shows the results of the Hamming intra-distance,
indicating high repeatability of the MoS2 security keys. The observed bit error rates are
measurement artifacts and originate from the limited spatial accuracy of the automated
sample stage when measuring the array.
To maximize the combination randomness of a binary array, each pixel should have
an equal probability of being ON or OFF. That is, there should be a uniformity in the
distribution of ON and OFF pixels in the array, with an ideal proportion of 0.5. Uniformity
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is quantified by the Hamming weight of the key, defined as the number of bit substitutions to
convert the key to an array of all zeros. We calculate the normalized Hamming weight on all
32 64-bit rows of the 2D binary array, and found the average to be 0.48 (see Supplementary
Information). The uniformity of the binary array arises from engineering the CVD process
to achieve equal surface coverage by monolayer and multilayer.
Finally, the emission properties of the physical cryptographic primitives are unchanged
after 6 months storage in ambient air, confirmed by measuring a random sample of 200 pixels,
shown in figure 4d. Those pixels were either fully covered by a monolayer or a multilayer
MoS2 film. The data indicates that our MoS2 physical cryptographic primitives are highly
stable.
Conclusions
We introduced a physical cryptographic primitive based on layered molybdenum disulfide
(MoS2). Two fundamental properties underlie this security technology: (i) complete spatial
randomness of multilayer island growth during chemical vapor deposition (CVD) of MoS2,
and (ii) strong thickness dependence of photoemission in MoS2. These security primitives
are easy to produce on a large scale using CVD and yet impossible to duplicate because of
complete spatial randomness of the multilayer island growth. The findings of this study can
be readily extended for the development of physically unclonable primitives based on other
semiconducting transition metal dichalcogenides.
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Methods
We performed CVD growth using MoO3 and sulfur solid precursors without requiring a
growth promoter. The growth was performed using a custom-made setup at 850 °C with a
nitrogen flow of 10 sccm. The optimal quantities of MoO3 and sulfur precursors are about
6 mg and 100 mg. In all the experiments, the films were grown in the presence of excess
sulfur. The 2D MoS2 array was fabricated using an e-beam lithography step followed by
patterning in an CF4/O2 plasma. The 2D arrays were stimulated using a green laser for
producing an optical response.
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